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In the chaos of Brexit, what about asset recovery? 
 
At the time of writing of this editorial, the uncertainty surrounding Brexit is as great as 
ever.  It is always dangerous to look too closely into crystal balls – it may be that by 
the time this is published, the Withdrawal Agreement concluded by Theresa May’s 
Government and the European Union will have been approved by the House of 
Commons and that the United Kingdom will leave the EU at midnight Brussels time 
on 29 March on the terms that it contains.  Maybe.  However, at the time of writing, 
the only persons predicting that with any confidence are members of May’s 
Government itself.  Elsewhere, the discussion is: if (some prefer to say “when”) the 
deal is rejected by the British Parliament, what happens then?  Will the UK leave on 
29 March, as the Prime Minister insists it must, with no deal at all?  This is the 
preferred outcome for a number within the Conservative Party, although not, it 
increasingly appears, within Parliament as a whole.  Will some alternative deal be 
negotiated?  That has consistently been ruled out by the European Union as a body 
(“this deal is the only deal”), although it would seem likely that membership of the 
European Economic Area, the so-called “Norway option”, would prove acceptable.  
The position of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn also in practice amounts to this, since 
he insists on a permanent customs union and an effective single market and the EU 
has made it clear that free movement of persons is a non-negotiable (if you will 
excuse the pun) condition for this.  Or will there be a second referendum, the so-
called “People’s Vote”, which as Prime Minister May has explicitly warned, could 
quite possibly result in no Brexit at all?  The judgment of the European Court of 
Justice that the United Kingdom has the legal power unilaterally to withdraw the 
Article 50 notice underlines the potential for this, as does the statement by President 
of the European Parliament Guy Verhofstadt  
In all of this, while much has rightly been said about the impact on businesses of the 
various forms of Brexit, as well as the ongoing rights of UK and EU citizens to live 
and work in each other’s jurisdictions, relatively little has been reported, other than in 
specialist papers such as those of the Standing Group on Organised Crime, on the 
impact on the fight against organised and economic crime.  Cooperation in this area 
will be significantly reduced.  After all, Prime Minister May has repeatedly 
emphasised that the entire point of Brexit is “to take back control of our borders, our 
money and our laws”.  That may, depending on one’s political stance, make sense 
when it comes to the UK freeing itself from the shackles of EU regulation.  And there 
have been repeated statements to the effect that of course the two sides will seek to 
continue to share intelligence (although rather less has been said as to how, given 
that the current arrangements for doing so will cease).  The ending of certain specific 
provisions for legal and judicial cooperation will, however, have a decided impact in 
another area: asset recovery.  Few would see it as beneficial to make it more difficult 
to pursue the fruits of a person’s crimes and only the most ardent hard Brexiteer 
would even see it as a reasonable price to pay for “regaining our independence”.  
But Brexit, even under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, let alone with no deal 
at all, will mean precisely this.  Indeed, of the options currently under discussion, 
only a calling off of Brexit (which would mean all arrangements currently functioning 
under the framework of EU laws and regulations continuing as they do now) would 
avoid it. 
Like many jurisdictions, the United Kingdom has two principal means of depriving 
criminals of the proceeds of their offences: criminal confiscation and civil recovery.  
Confiscation is a sentence (or part thereof) imposed by a criminal court.  Within the 
European Union, it may currently be enforced in another Member State through 
Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA on the application of mutual recognition 
of confiscation orders.  Under this, the English (or Scottish or Northern Irish) 
confiscation order is sent to the competent authority of, say, France or Estonia or 
Spain, where the funds in question are located.  (In the UK, a confiscation order 
relates solely to a monetary sum, albeit that this may represent the value of other 
forms of property).  The French, Estonian or Spanish authorities then recognise the 
order (“without further formality” (Article 7) and take the necessary measures to 
execute it.  Only on precise, specified grounds may this be refused; for example, the 
property must relate to one or more of a list of offences, not just any crime.  Under 
the Withdrawal Agreement, this system will continue to operate in respect of orders 
received by the authorities of other Member States before the end of the specified 
transition period, i.e. on or before 30 December 2020 (Article 62), but after that it will 
cease.  In the event of a no deal exit, the Council Framework Decision will simply 
cease to apply to the UK as of midnight Brussels time on 30 March 2019, 6 weeks 
from the time of writing, since it refers to confiscation orders from Member States 
and the UK will no longer be a Member State. 
The recognition of civil recovery orders under the current framework is in its way 
simpler.  A civil recovery order is not part of a criminal sentence, nor is it imposed by 
a criminal court.  It carries no implication whatsoever that the holder of the property 
has ever committed any criminal offence; indeed, in the case of National Crime 
Agency v Azam (No.2) (2014), the High Court made this particularly clear.  It is 
nothing more and nothing less than a civil lawsuit brought by the National Crime 
Agency before the High Court claiming a legal right to specific property on the basis 
that that property represents the proceeds of a criminal offence or, alternatively, an 
act committed abroad which would have been a criminal offence had it been 
committed in the UK and, further, was a crime in the jurisdiction where it was 
committed.  The result, if the NCA is successful, is an order in the form of a civil 
judgment. 
As such, a civil recovery order may, like any other civil judgment, currently be 
enforced in any Member State under the terms of the Brussels I Regulation recast.  
Chapter III of this provides that a judgment of a court of one Member State is to be 
recognised by any other “without any special procedure being required” (Article 36).  
Enforcement is similarly straightforward.  Although there are circumstances in which 
it may be refused, these are even more restricted than for confiscation orders: either 
a) enforcement would be manifestly contrary to public policy (e.g. enforcement in the 
UK of a judgment from a Danish court awarding damages for breach of a contract to 
supply pornographic material), b) a form of enforcement that does not exist in the 
Member State asked to provide it or c) a serious flaw in the judgment itself. 
However, just as with cooperation with regard to confiscation orders, the Withdrawal 
Agreement provides that the Brussels I Regulation recast, together with its 
predecessors relating to claims brought before the recast Regulation came into 
effect, will apply to judgments relating to proceedings instituted before 31 December 
2020.  Allowing for the time interval between an application for an order being made 
and that order being granted by the High Court, this means that it will only be 
possible to enforce civil recovery orders in the remaining 27 EU Member States 
under the Regulation up to the spring of 2021 at the latest.  After that, enforcement 
will be subject to the existence of bilateral agreements between the UK and the 
Member State concerned.  As things currently stand, the UK only has such bilateral 
agreements with a small number of Member States: Cyprus and Malta (as it does 
with most Commonwealth jurisdictions, dating from the British colonial era) plus 
Austria, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.  Again as with confiscation orders, 
should the UK leave the EU with no deal at all, it will not be the spring of 2021 when 
its civil recovery orders will become unenforceable in most of the European Union 
but 30 March 2019. 
For those concerned with the fight against economic crime, this is unfortunate 
enough.  For the United Kingdom, however, the timing could not be more ironic.  
Less than two years ago, section 1 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017, creating 
Unexplained Wealth Orders, came into force. (A reminder that Unexplained Wealth 
Orders function as an additional means of obtaining a civil recovery order.)  Likewise 
section 13 of the 2017 Act, extending the definition of unlawful conduct, the proceeds 
of which may be the subject of a civil recovery order, to gross violations of human 
rights committed abroad.  The effect of the United Kingdom leaving the European 
Union, as things currently stand, is that just as new legal provisions aimed at seizing 
the illicit wealth not only of economic criminals but those who have engaged in the 
most egregious abuses of political power have come into force, the ability to enforce 
them before the courts of other European jurisdictions will shortly end.  Readers of 
this journal may well have varying political views on the European Union, but 
wherever one stands on that, most would agree that such an outcome is far from 
desirable.  As the nature of the UK’s relationship with Europe is being debated 
afresh, we would urge that this issue be included. 
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